Volume 100
Issue 3 Issue 3, National Coal Issue

Article 7

April 1998

Asset Purchases, Successor Liability, and Insurance Coverage:
Does the Tail Always Follow the Dog
Albert Bates Jr. IV
Babst, Calland, Clements, and Zomnir

D. Matthew Jameson III
Babst, Calland, Clements, and Zomnir

Bren J. Pomponio
Babst, Calland, Clements, and Zomnir

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Property
Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Albert Bates Jr. IV, D. M. Jameson III & Bren J. Pomponio, Asset Purchases, Successor Liability, and
Insurance Coverage: Does the Tail Always Follow the Dog, 100 W. Va. L. Rev. (1998).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Bates et al.: Asset Purchases, Successor Liability, and Insurance Coverage: Doe

ASSET PURCHASES, SUCCESSOR LIABILITY,
AND INSURANCE COVERAGE:
DOES THE TAIL ALWAYS FOLLOW THE DOG?
Albert Bates, Jr.IV
D. Matthew Jameson II**
Bren J. Pomponio*

I.
II.
III.

INTRODUCTION ..........................................
KOPPERSINDUSTRIES, INC. v. NORTHRIVER INSURANCE COMPANY...

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY .....................................

A.

B.
IV.

SuccessorLiability .................................
Traditional Exceptions .......................
1.
Expansion of Successor Liability ...............
2.
Application of ProductliabilitySuccessorship Doctrines
to CERCLA Cases .................................

EXPANSIVE SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AND INSURANCE COVERAGE ....

A.

Northern Insurance ................................

632
634
638
638
638
639
641
647

648

B.A., 1983, Washington and Jefferson College; M.B.A., 1987, Vanderbilt University, Owen
Graduate School of Management; J.D., 1987, Vanderbilt University School of Law. Mr. Bates is a
shareholder in the Litigation Group of Babst, Calland, Clements & Zomnir, P.C., Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. His practice focuses on complex environmental, commercial, and construction litigation
and arbitration matters, primarily for large industrial and manufacturing clients. Mr. Bates served as
lead counsel for North River Insurance Company in Koppers Indus., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., No.
94-1706 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1996), affd, 103 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1996) (unpublished disposition)
[hereinafter North River].
B.A., 1988, Pennsylvania State University; J.D., with honors, 1992, Rutgers University
School of Law - Camden. Mr. Jameson is an associate in the Litigation Group of Babst, Calland,
Clements, and Zomnir, P.C., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He has focused his practice on complex
environmental, commercial, and construction litigation matters. Mr. Jameson served as "second-chair"
counsel for North River Insurance Company in North River.
B.A., 1992, The University of Georgia; J.D., with honors, 1998, West Virginia University
College of Law; Managing Editor, West Virginia Law Review, volume 100. Mr. Pomponio is currently
a law clerk for United States District Judge Joseph R. Goodwin. His contributions to this Article were
in large part due to the support and resources provided by the law firm Babst, Calland, Clements &
Zomnir during his clerkship with the firm in the summer of 1997. This author extends his sincere
appreciation to the firm for allowing him this opportunity.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 100:631

Expansive Successorship Doctrines and Insurance
Coverage Under CERCLA ...........................

653

V.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES ......................................

664
664
666
669

VI.

StructuringAsset PurchaseAgreements ................
A.
B.
LitigationIssues: EquitableArguments ................
C.
InsuranceIssues ...................................
CONCLUSION ............................................

670

I. INTRODUCTION

You are contacted by a rather irate in-house counsel for a long-standing
client of your firm, and he is looking for answers to the following questions: Why
is his company being sued for the cleanup of hazardous substances that were
disposed of long before the company ever bought the property? Why may the
company still be sued even though, as he interprets the purchase agreement, all
environmental liabilities for historically disposed waste, including liability pursuant
to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA"),' were retained by the prior owner of the property? Why does his
company have to foot the bill simply because it is financially stable and has a "deep
pocket?" Why isn't the predecessor providing his company with defense and
indemnification pursuant to the purchase agreement? Is there any potential
insurance coverage available to his company? Is there any potential insurance
coverage available to his company through policies issued to any of the prior
owners?
As the tirade subsides, you advise the client that the terms of a contract
were at one time sacrosanct in all jurisdictions, but now creative lawyers try to
manipulate the law of successor liability to circumvent the arrangements agreed to
by the parties.2 In the area of product liability claims by personally injured
plaintiffs, some states have expanded traditional successorship notions and, as a
result, successor corporations may sometimes find themselves saddled with
liabilities that they did not anticipate at the time they purchased the assets of a
business.' More recently, a few courts have applied expansive successorship
doctrines to cases involving environmental liabilities, including those arising under

1

42 U.S.C.§ § 9601-9675 (1994).

2

See, e.g., United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., No. 1:CV-93-1482, 1996 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 1365, at *31 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1996).
3

See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8 (Cal. 1977).
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CERCLA. 4 You also advise the client that you remember reading an advance sheet
indicating that when successor corporations are subject to judicially-imposed
liability despite provisions to the contrary in the purchase agreement, contractual
language has been overlooked by courts on occasion to allow a successor
corporation to access insurance policies issued to a predecessor that were
specifically retained under the purchase agreement by the predecessor corporation.'
Lastly, you advise the client that given the complexity and novelty of the issues
involved, significant legal research will be required before responding further on
these issues.
This Article explores the limited circumstances under which some courts
have permitted insurance coverage to follow the liability rather than the policy
holder. The Article provides an analytical framework in which to consider issues
relating to the transfer of insurance coverage to a successor corporation as a matter
of law. Part II of this Article discusses the recent case Koppers Industries,Inc. v.
North River Insurance Company,6 which illustrates the application of these
principles in the context of a commercial product liability claim. North River serves
as a logical example of how the manner of succession to a particular liability may
be critical to a court in determining whether the current owner is entitled to an
interest in insurance policies issued to, and specifically retained by,.a predecessor.
Part 1I briefly outlines the traditional doctrine of successor liability, its expansion
in certain states in the context of product liability claims, and the manner in which
some courts have applied expansive successorship doctrines to environmental cases.
Part IV of this Article discusses the limited circumstances under which courts have
granted a successor an interest in insurance policies issued to a predecessor
corporation. Part V concludes by discussing several issues that remain unresolved
in this developing area of the law.

4

See infraPart III.B.

See, e.g., Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th
Cir. 1992); Total Waste Management Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 140, 151
(D.N.H. 1994).
5

6

North River, No. 941706 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1996), affd, 103 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1996)

(unpublished table decision) [hereinafter North River].
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II. KOPPERSINDUSTRIES, INC. v. NORTHRIVER INSURANCE COMPANY
Real-life facts with real dollars at stake for real clients often present factual
situations that have more twists and turns than law school exams. Consider the
following factual scenario from the North River case.'
It all started with coal that was mined from deep beneath the ground,
washed in ajig, and loaded in railcars or barges for shipment to a coke plant. At the
coke plant, the coal was baked in a coke oven in the absence of oxygen at over 2000
degrees Fahrenheit for a day, more or less. The incandescent coke, now almost pure
carbon, was "pushed" from the ovens and "quenched" with a water and ammonia
liquor mixture to cool the coke. The coke generated in the process was shipped to
an iron plant, where coke, iron ore, and limestone are combined in mammoth blast
furnaces to produce pig iron, the elemental foundation of the iron and steel industry.
The manufacture of coke also generated many valuable coal by-products,
such as coal tar. Typically, the crude coal tar from the coking process was stored
and shipped from the coke plant by pipeline, railcar, or tanker truck to a tar refining
plant. At the tar plant, the crude coal tar was refined into various materials used for
highway construction, roofing supplies, waterproofing applications, wood treating
applications, or a variety of other important industrial purposes. One of the specific
roofing materials manufactured at some tar plants was coal tar roofing pitch or
"bitumen." Coal tar bitumen was the product at the core of the litigation underlying
the North River case.
Koppers Company, Inc. ("KCI") produced coal tar bitumen, which was used
in the construction of a large, flat roof for an automobile assembly plant in
Tennessee. The roof was enormous, with enough surface area to cover thirty
football fields. The "built-up" roof at issue was constructed with Owens-Coming
Fiberglas ("OCF") roofing felts by an authorized OCF contractor.8 In general terms,
KCI supplied the bitumen, OCF supplied all other materials and labor, and OCF
issued a twenty-year warranty on the roof to the automobile manufacturer.
7

As set forth above, authors Bates and Jameson were counsel for North River Insurance

Company in the North River case.
8

In roofing parlance, the enormous flat roof is a "built-up" roof. The roofing membrane is

generally comprised of alternating layers of roofing felt, heavy fabric impregnated with asphalt or
bitumen. The OCF felts at issue had been impregnated with asphalt, a petroleum derivative. A layer
of bitumen is spread on the roof followed by a layer of felt, then more bitumen and more felt until four
layers of felt have been installed. More bitumen is then poured on top of these built-up layers,
followed by covering the entire roof with a layer of stone aggregate. Built-up roofs are widely used
for industrial and heavy commercial purposes, which require flat roofs, and coal tar is the traditional
bitumen of choice because of its "self-healing" properties. In other words, if cracks in the flat roof
develop, the coal tar remains viscous and with the aid of gravity will seal or patch the crack thereby
remaining water tight.
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The underlying litigation arose because the roof that was installed at the
automobile assembly plant allegedly leaked. There were a myriad of potential
causes of the leaks, including defective workmanship, defective felts, defective
bitumen, a reaction between the asphalt in the felts and the coal tar bitumen, and a
host of other potential causes. However, because it had issued a guarantee on the
roof, OCF replaced the entire roof, which cost millions of dollars.
The takeover boom of the 1980s hit KCI in 1988. Following a hostile
takeover, the tar division and certain other assets and liabilities of KCI were sold
to a newly formed corporation, Koppers Industries, Inc. ("KII")? KII continued to
sell a variety of tar products, including coal tar bitumen. KCI 0 continued to operate
certain business units and also managed the liabilities that it retained after the
divestitures. Consequently, OCF filed suit against both KCI and KII, alleging that
the coal tar bitumen was a defective product and asserting a variety of productliability related causes of action."
The asset purchase agreement pursuant to which KII acquired certain assets
and liabilities of KCI ("APA") contained an arbitration clause which mandated that
all disputes arising out of or relating to the agreement be settled by arbitration.
Consequently, instead of the parties filing cross-claims against one another in the
OCF Action, KII filed an arbitration demand against KCI, alleging that KCI
contractually retained responsibility for the types of claims presented in the OCF
Action. A lengthy arbitration proceeding concluded that KII had contractually
assumed responsibility for claims of the type being asserted by OCF. Accordingly,
the liabilities at issue in the OCF Action were the contractual responsibility of KII,
pursuant to the APA.

Joint Stipulations of Fact, North River, No. 94-1706 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1996) [hereinafter
JointStipulationsof Fact].The facts set forth in the next two paragraphs are taken from the document
entitled, Joint Stipulations of Fact, filed by counsel for KII and North River in the district court
proceedings on or about June 9, 1995.
9

10

After the hostile takeover and the divestiture of other business units, the name of KCI

changed. Those transactions and the name changes are not germane to this discussion, and are
therefore omitted.
OCF commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio (DocketNo. 90-CV-7226) and an action in the Court of Common Pleas for Lucas County, Ohio
(Docket No. C190-1622) relating to the same facts and circumstances, but naming different corporate
entities as defendants. The state court action was stayed pending the resolution of the federal lawsuit.
As used herein, the term, "OCF Action" will refer collectively to the federal and state court lawsuits.
In addition, the OCF Action also sought recovery of damages for a number of other built-up roofs
which OCF guaranteed and which were constructed by an OCF authorized contractor with OCF felts
and other products and KCIIKII coal tar bitumen.
i1
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Following the arbitration but during the pendency of the OCF Action, KII
commenced the North River case, seeking defense and indemnity under insurance
policies issued to KCI for the liabilities at issue in the OCF Action. KII alleged that
insurance had been purchased to protect KCI from product liability claims,
including those related to coal tar bitumen, and that KII was entitled to access any
insurance that might potentially respond to the assumed liabilities. KCI, however,
contended that it was sole owner of the policies, and that its insurance policies
afforded it protection against a wide variety of retained liabilities. Any recovery of
insurance proceeds by KI would diminish the policy limits available to KCI.
Further, KCI contended that it specifically retained the insurance policies under the
APA. North River Insurance Company's position was very simple - in addition to
a variety of policy defenses which may be available, KII did not have any legally
cognizable interest in the policies.
The court in North River permitted the parties to submit the following
threshold coverage issue for resolution on stipulated facts, holding the balance of
the case in abeyance:
Assuming solely for purposes of the.., summary judgment and
partial summary judgment motions that coverage is afforded under
the subject North River Policies for some or all of the OCF Action,
may KII recover under the North River Policies, which were issued
to KCI before the December 28, 1988 Asset Purchase Agreement
between KCI and KII? 2
The district court found that under Pennsylvania law, KII did not obtain an
interest in the insurance policies issued to KCI by way of contract,13 and the
circumstances did not warrant transferring an interest in the policies to KII by
matter of law.'" In summary, the district court concluded:
[T]he Court finds that KII and KCI negotiated a detailed purchase
and sale agreement, and the terms of that agreement demonstrate
the parties' intent that KCI .... would retain its rights under North
River's insurance policies. No basis exists for this Court to alter
the contractual bargain that KII has made. Accordingly, this Court

12

Joint Stipulations ofFact,supra note 9, at 1. Further, it should be noted that KII brought

the action against North River. KCI later intervened in the action.
13

Memorandum Opinion at 6, North River, No. 94-9706.

14

Id. at 10.
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will grant defendant North River's motion for summary judgment,
the Court having found that KI has no cognizable interest, either
as a matter of contract or as a matter of law, in the North River
policies that were issued to KCI."5
During the pendency of the North River appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the jury in the OCF Action returned a verdict in
favor of OCF and against KI1 in the amount of $9,815,133 in compensatory
damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. 6 The jury also awarded OCF its
reasonable attorney fees and costs. 7 Thereafter, following full briefing and oral
argument, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court decision in the North River
case.

18

The North River case presents a logical framework for the consideration of
how the manner of succession to a particular liability may be a critical factor in
determining entitlement to an interest in insurance policies issued to a former owner
of assets, including real property. The first inquiry is whether the purchaser
assumed the liability as a matter of contract, or whether the court imposed the
particular liability upon the purchaser as a matter of law. The answer to this inquiry
is related to, but not necessarily determinative of, the second line of inquiry:
whether there exists a basis, either as a matter of contractual agreement or as matter
of law rooted in public policy, to grant the successor a legally cognizable interest
in insurance policies that were issued to and paid for by a predecessor company.
The North River case also serves as an illustration of the complexity of the
law of successorship, and the significant financial impact of its consequences.
While the amount at stake in North River exceeded $10,000,000, claims in
insurance coverage litigation relating to historical environmental contamination
often run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. As a consequence, the law of
successorship, and its interface with traditional contract law, federal statutory
schemes such as CERCLA, and fundamental insurance law principles, will be
pushed to their outer boundaries as creative lawyers seek to find "deep pockets,"
either by expanding the breadth of successorship law or by questioning traditional

15

Id. at 16-17.

16

OCFAction, No. 3:90CV7226, Special Verdict (April 3, 1996).

Id. A judgment was entered upon the Special Verdict. See id., Judgment in a Civil Case
(April 4, 1996).
17

is

Koppers Indus. Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 103 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1996) (unpublished table

decision).
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notions of contract law to enlarge the universe of persons who have an insurable
interest in a policy. 9
The analysis that follows is set forth in two steps. First, under what
circumstances may liabilities resulting from activities that occurred prior to the
acquisition of a business be imposed upon a purchaser? This question is examined
in greater detail in the next Part. Second, assuming that certain pre-purchase
liabilities are imposed upon a buyer, either as a matter of contract or as a matter of
law, under what circumstances have some courts given the purchaser an insurable
interest in insurance policies issued to a predecessor? This question is examined
in greater detail in Part IV.

III. SUCCESSOR LIABILiTY
A.

Successor Liability
1.

Traditional Exceptions

"The general rule, which is well settled, is that where one company sells or
otherwise transfers all its assets to another company, the latter is not liable for the
debts and liabilities of the transferor."2 As is the case with most general rules of
law, however, this rule has some exceptions. Specifically, there are four traditional
exceptions to the general rule of non-liability for successor corporations:

1.

Contractual Assumption of Liabilities: Under this
exception, the successor corporation must have either
expressly or impliedly assumed the liabilities at issue
pursuant to the contractual agreement which created the
successor corporation.

2.

Merger (express or defacto): Under this exception, the
successor corporation must be a merged version of the
predecessor and successor corporations.

See Stephen F. Baicker-McKee, American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Compagnie
Bruxelles Lambert: A New Line of Defensefor ParentCorporations,27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10450, 10450 (1997) ("Parties facing large environmental liabilities are trolling for solvent defendants
with an increasingly wide net.").
19

20

See 15 WILLIAM M.

FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE

CORPORATIONS § 7122 (per. ed. rev. vol. 1990).
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3.

Mere Continuation: Under this exception, the successor
corporation must be a mere continuation or reincarnation

of the predecessor corporation.
4.

Fraud: Under this exception, the successor corporation
may be held liable for the predecessor's liabilities if the
transaction is conducted merely to escape liability.21

These four traditional exceptions are widely recognized and fairly well

defined. As a result, parties can structure a business transaction to allocate
liabilities related to historical operations among themselves, and allow the purchase
price to reflect the agreed-upon allocation of liabilities. Until the expansion of
successor liability in the 1970s and 1980s,' which will be discussed in the next
section, parties to an asset purchase agreement enjoyed a reasonable degree of
security in the fact that liabilities would follow the provisions in the asset purchase
agreement or other instrument of sale.
2.

Expansion of Successor Liability

In the mid 1970s to 1980s, some states began to recognize further
exceptions that expanded successor liability, primarily in the area of personal injury
product liability claims.2 Specifically, two additional exceptions were adopted in

21

Id.; See generallyMichael D. Kristofco, Comment, Successor Liability: The Debate Over

the Continuityof EnterpriseException in Ohio is Really No Debate at All, 21 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 297
(1994).
22

Michael D. Green, Successors and CERCLA: The Imperfect Analogy to ProductsLiability

and an Alternative Proposal,87 NW. U. L. REV. 897, 903 (1993).
Green, supra note 22, at 903. The expansion in successor liability was primarily in response
to situations where an injured plaintiff's claim had been extinguished through corporate transactions.
Id. Especially in the case of latent, or long-tail product liability claims, claimants found that their
claims were vanishing due to the frequent corporate reorganizations of the 1970s and 1980s. See
generally id.
The expansion of successor liability has generated some debate. Proponents of expanding
successor liability justify expansion on the grounds that the successor relies on the predecessor's good
will; the successor is in the best position to warn of defects in the predecessor's products; the successor
is a conduit by which a court can transfer liability to the predecessor via the asset purchase agreement;
and the successor corporation is in a better position to bear the loss because it may spread the cost
among a greater number of people. See FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 7123.05; Green, supranote 22,
at 906; Mark J. Roe, Mergers Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor
CorporationLiability, 70 VA. L. REv. 1559, 1559-60 (1984). On the other hand, successor liability
opponents cite their own grounds for limiting successor liability: the successor is not at fault; the
2
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a minority of jurisdictions: the "continuity of enterprise" exception24 and the
"product-line" exception'
Under the continuity of enterprise exception, a
successor corporation may be subject to successor liability if the totality of the

transaction demonstrates that the successor corporation is basically a continuation
of the predecessor's enterprise.2 6 The difference between the traditional mere
continuation doctrine and the continuity of enterprise exception is that the former
focuses on a continuity of shareholders, and the later focuses on the continuity of
the business.2 7 The product-line exception may apply when a successor corporation

purchases substantially all of the assets from which the product liability claim

successor cannot enhance the safety of the predecessor's products; there is no deterrence for
misbehavior, and the imposition of excess liabilities stifles the transferability of assets. See FLETCHER,
supra note 20 § 7123.05; Roe, supra,at 1560.
24

The continuity of enterprise exceptions has been adopted in Alabama, Michigan, Mississippi,

and South Carolina. Kristofco, supra note 21, at 307 (citing cases).
The highest courts of only three states have embraced the product-line exception for
successor corporation,;: California, New Jersey, and Washington. See Conway v. White Trucks, 885
F.2d 90, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1989); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977); Ramirez v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 822 (N.J. 1981); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 388 (Wash. 1984);
Alfred R. Light, "ProductLine" and "Continuity ofEnterprise" Theories of CorporateSuccessor
Liability Under CERCLA, 11 Miss. C. L. REv. 63, 71 (1990).
2

See Kristofco, supra note 21, at 302 (quoting Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244
N.W.2d 873, 892 (Mich. 1976)).
26

27

See Light,supra note 25, at 72. The continuity of enterprise rule was first introduced by the

Michigan Supreme Court in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976). The
court provided four factors to evaluate whether a continuity of enterprise existed: (1) when the
management, personnel, location, assets, and operations continues as it had for the predecessor; (2)
when the predecessor corporation dissolves after the sale; (3) when the successor corporation assumes
the predecessor's liabilities in order to facilitate the transfer and continuation of business operations;
and (4) when the successor corporation holds itself out to be a continuation of the predecessor's
enterprise. See Turner, 244 N.W.2d. at 879, 882; see also Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75,
79 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986); Light, supra note 25, at 72.
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arises.2 8 Both exceptions may impose liability as a matter of law irrespective of the
provisions allocating liability in the asset purchase agreement.
One of the themes behind the expansion of successor liability was
sympathy for the personally injured product liability claimant. 9 The courts that
have adopted the "product-line" and "continuity of enterprise" exceptions have
found, as a matter of public policy, that an injured plaintiff's product liability claim
should not be defeated by corporate re-structuring.30 Someone should be made to
pay for the plaintiff's injury. Further, it is significant to consider that product
liability plaintiffs are not parties to the corporate transaction giving rise to the
liability and are therefore unable to protect their interests during the transaction.
Thus, the policy considerations supporting the expansion of the successor liability
doctrine are rooted in traditional tort and strict liability concepts. In jurisdictions
that adopt the "product-line" and "continuity of enterprise" exceptions, the
liabilities assigned by the parties in the asset purchase have been disrupted when the
interests of an independent third party are affected by the agreement?'
B.

Application of Product liability Successorship Doctrines to
CERCLA Cases

Given the magnitude ofthe investigation and remediation costs in CERCLA
cases, parties have recently attempted to apply expansive successorship doctrines
to CERCLA liability issues, causing courts to balance the competing interests of
finding viable companies to pay for environmental investigation and remediation
of historically disposed waste and upholding the sanctity of the written contract and
28

The product-line exception was originally adopted by the California Supreme Court in Ray

v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977). The Ray court stated that "[t]he paramount policy to be
promoted by the rule is the protection of otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and
the spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating them." Id. at 8 (quoting Price v. Shell
Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 725 (Cal. 1976)). Generally, the exception has three requirements: (1) the
successor corporation must acquire substantially all of the predecessor's assets, "leaving no more than
a corporate shell remaining;" (2) the successor corporation must hold itself out to the public as a
continuation of the predecessor, and (3) the successor corporation must benefit from the good will of
the predecessor. FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 7132.07.
29

Green, supra note 22, at 909.

30

See generally Turner,244 N.W.2d at 878-79.

31

One commentator noted that the trend in expanding successor liability from the 1980s

"fizzled" in the 1990s. See Green, supranote 22, at 909. However, despite this downtrend and the
fact that the product-line and continuity of enterprise exceptions have been adopted in only a few
jurisdictions, parties must consider the possible impact ofjudicially-imposed liability when structuring
purchase agreements.
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other well-established principles that are protective of the corporate form and
traditional corporate law. 2

The two cases of Smithkline Beecham Corp.

As an example, there is activity in the United States Supreme Court with respect to the extent
to which a parent corporation may be held liable for environmental contamination resulting from a
subsidiary's activities, and the extent to which a shareholder may be held liable for environmental
contamination resulting from a corporation's activities. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
UnitedStates v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997), sub. noma. below, United States v. Cordova
Chem. Corp., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc). In Cordova, a seven to five vote of the members
of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a parent corporation which owns 100% of a subsidiary
may only be held liable for environmental contamination resulting from a subsidiary's activities when
the requirements necessary to pierce the corporate veil are met. Cordova, 113 F.3d at 580.
In other words, under the circumstances of this case, whether the parent will be
liable as an operator depends upon whether the degree to which it controls its
subsidiary and the extent and manner of its involvement with the facility, amounts
to the abuse of the corporate form that will warrant piercing the corporate veil and
disregarding the separate corporate entities of the parent and subsidiary. Whether
the circumstances in this case warrant piercing a corporate veil will be determined
by state law.
Id. See also Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying a similar
"piercing the corporate veil" test). After issuing its decision in Cordova, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit also addressed whether a sole shareholder may be held liable as an operator under
CERCLA. See Donahey v. Bogle, 129 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc), pet.for cert. filed, 66
U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. Jan. 9 1998) (No. 97-1163). In Donahey, the court concluded that a stockholder
is not liable as an operator under CERCLA unless circumstances justify piercing the corporate veil.
Id. at 843. Cf Riverside Market Dev. Corp. v. Int'l Bldg. Products, Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir.
1991) (explaining that individual officers and shareholder may be directly liable as operators under
CERCLA when they actively participate in the conduct; and distinguishing this from the derivative
liability that results from piercing the corporate veil).
Other courts of appeals have applied less onerous standards to the question of when a parent
corporation may be liable for environmental contamination resulting from a subsidiary's activities, or
when a shareholder may be held liable for contamination resulting from a corporation's activities. In
the parent-subsidiary context, four courts of appeals have imposed CERCLA operator liability upon
parent corporations by virtue of their active participation in and exercise of active control over the
operations of their subsidiaries. See Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 1996); LansfordCoaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1220-25 (3d Cir. 1993); Jacksonville Elec.
Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.,
910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990). These courts have subjected parent corporations to direct liability
based on their actual involvement in the operation of a subsidiary's facility.
In addition to the decisions of those courts, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have indicated in
dicta that a parent corporation may be held liable as an operator based on.its control over a subsidiary's
facility. See United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1091 (8th Cir. 1995); AT&T Co. v.
Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 590 n.8 (1996) opinion supplemented on other grounds,
95 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 1996). The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have similarly resolved the analogous
issue of whether individual corporate officers may be liable under CERCLA by applying a standard
based on personal participation and actual control. See Sydney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ.
Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1994); FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 846 (10th Cir.
1993). The Fourth Circuit has adopted a more expansive standard of operator liability, indicating that
the mere "authority to control the facility" is sufficient for establishing operator liability. Se Nurad,
32
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v. Rohm andHaas Co.33 and UnitedStates v. Keystone SanitationCo., Inc.3" present
contrasting approaches to this issue. In Keystone Sanitation,the court judicially
imposed CERCLA liability contrary to the express provisions in an asset purchase
agreement." In Smithkline Beecham, the court refused to shift liabilities that
already had been assigned between the parties by contract? 6 Whether a court uses
the expansive successor liability approach of Keystone Sanitation or the more
economics-based approach of Smithkline Beecham may affect the issue of whether
that court will transfer insurance coverage to a successor corporation, contrary to
the provisions of the asset purchase agreement.
In Smithkline Beecham, the plaintiff, Smithkline Beecham, purchased the
assets of Whitmoyer Laboratories from Rohm and Haas.?7 Rohm and Haas had
purchased Whitmoyer from a predecessor corporation?8 Whitmoyer Laboratories
discharged hazardous substances into the environment during both Smithkline
Beecham's and Rohm and Haas' ownership. However, most of the contamination
occurred prior to Rohm and Haas' ownership.39 In the asset purchase agreement
between Smithkline Beecham and Rohm and Haas, Rohm and Haas agreed to
indemnify Smithkline Beecham for liabilities arising out of "operation of the
Business."4 Rohm and Haas argued that the indemnification covered only

Inc. v. William E.Hooper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992). The Petitioner's Brief in
United States v. CPC Int'l, Inc., No. 97-454, available in 1998 WL 25589 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1998)
provides further amplification on these issues and the holdings in these cases.
As one commentator has put it, "[p]arties facing large environmental liabilities are trolling
for solvent defendants with an increasingly wide net... [and] [p]arent corporations are one category
of defendants that is more and more frequently being snared." Baicker-McKee, supra note 19, at
10450. The point is that the search for the proverbial deep pocket widens as the cumulative magnitude
of the claims expands.
33

89 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1996).

34

No. 1:CV-93-1482, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13651 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1996).

35

Id at *33.

36

Smithldine Beecham, 89 F.3d at 164.

37

Id. at 156.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id. at 157.
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liabilities arising during the time in which it owned Whitmoyer.'" The district court
did not resolve the scope of the indemnification and instead ruled that Rohm and
Haas succeeded to the environmental liabilities arising before its ownership under
the de facto merger doctrine.42 The Third Circuit reversed the district court's
decision.43
The Third Circuit reasoned that Smithkline Beecham and Rohm and Haas
had an opportunity to allocate liabilities through the asset purchase agreement."
Because the indemnification expressly excluded liabilities that arose before Rohm
and Haas' ownership, the court concluded that the parties had allocated such
liabilities to Smithkline Beecham 5 The court refused to impose successor liability
on Rohm and Haas to the extent that it would contravene the provisions of the asset
purchase agreement: "[W]here two sophisticated corporations drafted an
indemnification provision that excluded the liabilities of a predecessor corporation,
we will not use the de facto merger doctrine to circumvent the parties' objective
intent."' 6 The Smithkline Beecham court's holding reflects an Adam Smith, Posnertype approach, where the express intent of the parties is not disturbed by judicially
imposing expansive principles of successor liability contrary to the provisions
specifically allocating the liabilities in the asset purchase agreement. 47

41

Id. at 158.

42

Id. at 162-64.

43

Id. at 164.

Id. at 163. The court stated, "the de facto merger doctrine will not shift environmental
liabilities where the parties were in a position to protect themselves through a contractual provision."

44

Id.
45

Id. at 162.

46

Id. at 163.

The Third Circuit took a similar approach in Alcoa v. Beazer East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551 (3d
Cir. 1997). In Alcoa, the district court concluded that Beazer was liable as a successor because it
characterized the business transaction that occurred in 1954 as a defacto merger. Id. at 555. The
Third Circuit began its analysis with the proposition that "[a]lthough CERCLA is silent on the matter
of successor liability, we have held that the same general rule of successor non-liability and the same
exceptions to that rule, apply in the CERCLA context." Id. at 565 (citations omitted). Compare B.F.
Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996), on reh'g, 112 F.3d 88, 90 (1997), petitionfor cert.
pending, 66 U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. July 23, 1997) (No. 97-241) (holding that federal common law
governs the question of successor liability under CERCLA); with Green, supra note 22, at 911 (noting
that both the EPA and United States Department of Justice have taken the position that federal courts
should utilize federal common law to apply liberal theories of successor liability to CERCLA cases).
47
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In Keystone Sanitation, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania employed expansive successorship doctrine to judicially
impose CERCLA liability despite the express provisions of an asset purchase
agreement.4 8 Keystone Sanitation owned a landfill that the EPA placed on the
National Priorities List ('NPL").49 The United States then pursued an action under
CERCLA against Keystone Sanitation.50 Keystone Sanitation in turn sought
contribution from 180 third parties, including Waste Management, who might have
been partly responsible for the contamination. 5' Waste Management was joined
because it had purchased the assets of Keystone Sanitation after the landfill was
placed on the NPL.52 Knowing of the potential CERCLA liability, Waste

Management insisted on including a broad indemnification provision in the asset

purchase agreement.5 3
The Keystone Sanitation court declared that it must look beyond the
agreement of the parties to ascertain the true nature of the transaction.5 4 Looking
to the facts, the court concluded that under both a defacto merger analysis and a
continuity of enterprise analysis, Waste Management succeeded to the liabilities of
Keystone Sanitation.55 The court claimed that the defactor merger doctrine would

Next, the court noted that if a purchaser expressly or impliedly assumes the liabilities of the transferor,
the first of the traditional exceptions, the court need not "address the possible application of the de
facto merger doctrine to this case because a more direct route to demonstrating.., successor liability
is apparent." Alcoa, 124 F.3d at 565.
United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., No.:Cv-93-1482, 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13651,
at *28 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22 1996).

48

49

Id. at *26.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

Id. at *33. "The court's use of the de facto merger doctrine is consistent with its obligation
to ascertain the true nature of the transaction between the parties, despite their attempts to label the sale
an asset purchase." Id. at *32.
54

Id. at *32. Waste Management also argued that imposing liability on Waste Management
would "contravene CERCLA's remedial purpose," which is to "encourage clean-up by any responsible
party." Id. at *34 (quoting Smithkline Beecham Corp. V. Rohm and Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.
1996)). The court dismissed this argument, claiming that Waste Management should be a responsible
55
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be meaningless if the parties could avoid its application by labeling a de facto
merger an asset purchase5 6 Hence, despite the express indemnification provisions
in the asset purchase agreement, the court allowed Keystone to include Waste
Management as potentially liable for the environmental costs associated with the
Keystone landfill!' Unlike the Smithkline Beecham court, the Keystone Sanitation
court weighed the remedial purposes of CERCLA over the intent of the contracting
parties."

party because it "reap[ed] the economic benefits of its predecessor's use of hazardous disposal methods
and, as the recipient of those benefits, is responsible for the cost of those benefits." Id. at *34 (internal
quotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir.
1992)). It is unclear whether Waste Management reaped any economic benefit from Keystone
Sanitation's "hazardous disposal methods." Presumably, Keystone Sanitation's retention of CERCLA
liabilities was reflected in the purchase price: Waste Management likely paid more for the assets and
indemnification than it would have to simply absorb Keystone's liabilities. Thus, if Waste
Management were held liable for clean-up costs, Keystone Sanitation would incur a windfall by
benefitting from a higher purchase price and also potentially escaping liability.
However, the response to this argument is that application of the defacto merger doctrine
will always contravene the express arrangements between the parties. The court addressed any
potential windfall that Keystone Sanitation may acquire. The court stated that because the successor
liability doctrines are "equitable in nature," Keystone Sanitation would be primarily liable for clean-up
costs. Id. at *44 (citing Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 128, 139 (D. Mass. 1996)). Again,
however, the response to this position is it may not be wholly satisfactory to charge a party liable under
CERCLA with the caveat that its liability may never translate into actual damages. The pressure to
settle and the enormous litigation costs associated with a determination that a party is liable argues
against a court deferring to a determination of liability under CERCLA. See Acushnet Co. v. Coaters,
Inc., 948 F. Supp. 128, 139 (D. Mass. 1996) (explaining the "economic realities" of complex
environmental litigation).
Keystone Sanitation, 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13651, at *33. "To permit parties to a de facto
merger to exclude the transfer of certain enumerated liabilities would defeat the purpose of applying
the doctrine in the first instance." Id. at *34.
56

57

Id. at *36.

The Keystone Sanitation court did address the apparent conflict with Third Circuit precedent.
Id. at *32. The court essentially made a factual distinction between the two cases, asserting that
Smithidine Beecham "does not preclude courts from finding the existence of a de facto merger in the
presence of a liability exclusion clause in an agreement of sale." Id. at *33-34. The court explained
that if it had determined that the sale was simply a purchase of assets, then Waste Management would
not be liable under CERCLA. Id. at *32-33. Waste Management's counsel disagreed with the district
court's analysis, claiming that "the court has basically said that there is no way to protect yourself
against liability from a company if you buy their assets and customer list" and that the court ignored
58

Third Circuit precedent. CorporateSuccessor Ruling 'Very Negative,' Vastly Expands Liability,
Defense Lawyer Says, 11 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) 432 (Sept. 11, 1996) [hereinafter CorporateSuccessor

Ruling]. An environmental attorney commenting on the Keystone Sanitationopinion stated that the
court's approach is consistent with the "practical concerns of the courts in getting everybody around
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The question of whether a court will apply expansive product liability
successorship doctrines to CERCLA cases, despite the clear language of an asset
purchase agreement, can have an enormous impact on a corporation's bottom line.
Consequently, if expansive successorship theories are applied to CERCLA cases,
successors may seek to pass the costs on to others, including the predecessor's
insurers. The next section will discuss the limited circumstances under which
courts have transferred insurance coverage issued to a predecessor to a successor
under the theory that insurance coverage follows the liability, not necessarily the
policyholder.
IV. EXPANSIVE SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AND INSURANCE COVERAGE
A logical framework for consideration of the circumstances under which
an asset purchaser may be entitled to an interest in an insurance policy issued to a
predecessor begins with consideration of the manner of succession to that liability.
The initial inquiry is whether the purchaser assumed the liability as a matter of
contract or whether a court imposed the liability on the purchaser as a matter of
law, presumably for a public policy objective. Logic indicates that this inquiry,
while not necessarily determinative, would be highly instructive as to whether a
successor is entitled to proceeds from an insurance policy issued to a predecessor.
For example, in the context of a merger, the successor assumes all the liabilities of
the predecessor but also inherits all the benefits of insurance policies issued to the
predecessor. In an asset purchase, logic and traditional contract principles leads one
to conclude that if a purchaser expressly assumes a liability in the purchase
agreement, and the predecessor retains all rights and interests in any insurance
policies that may respond to those liabilities, then the purchaser is self-insured with
respect to the assumed liability.59 If the contract governs the manner of succession
to a liability, then logic dictates that the contract likewise governs the parties'
respective entitlement to an interest in the insurance policies of the predecessor.
Logic also leads to the conclusion that if a court disregards the contractual
allocation of liabilities in an asset purchase and judicially imposes a liability upon
a purchaser, the purchaser may also have a right to access policies of insurance
issued to its predecessor despite contractual language to the contrary.
In this era where some jurisdictions expansively apply successorship
principles in product liability and other contexts, while others follow a more
traditional, conservative approach, a court may or may not reach the logical result.

the settlement table prior to any adjudication on the merits" in landfill cases. CorporateSuccessor
Ruling, supra, at 433.
59

See, e.g., North River, No. 94-1706, at 3-8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1996).
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Equity has been known, on occasion, to outweigh logic.' The following discussion
analyzes the limited circumstances under which courts have permitted successors
to obtain access to insurance policies issued to a predecessor.
A.

Northern Insurande

In NorthernInsurance Co. of New York v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,61
the Ninth Circuit held that a the court imposes liabilities on a successor as a matter
of law under the product-line exception, then the successor is entitled to insurance
coverage related to those liabilities under policies issued to the predecessor. The
dispute in Northern Insurancearose when Dawn Howard brought a product liability
claim against the makers of California Coolers alleging that Dawn Howard's
ingestion of California Coolers during her pregnancy resulted in birth defects to her
child.
Brown-Forman Corporation purchased "substantially all" of the assets of
California Coolers through an asset purchase agreement two years after the birth of
Pursuant to the terms of the asset purchase
the Howards' injured child. 2
agreement: (1) the predecessor contractually retained liability for and agreed to
indemnify the successor against any product liability claims arising from the
predecessor's pre-sale claims; and, (2) the successor did not contractually assume
any obligation for pre-sale claims. Two years after the purchase, the Howards filed
suit against Brown-Forman. Brown-Forman subsequently tendered the claim to its
insurer, Northern Insurance. Northern Insurance, in turn, requested contribution for
defense costs from California Cooler's insurer, Allied Mutual.63 Eventually, the
Howards voluntarily dismissed their claim. Northern Insurance then instituted a
contribution action against Allied Mutual for the costs associated with the defense
of the Howards' claim. The district court held that Brown-Forman was entitled to
defense costs under the Allied Mutual policies by operation of law. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding.

60

As lawyers have been saying for years, "[if] the facts are against you, argue the law. If the

law is against you, argue the facts. If both the facts and the law are against you, obfuscate!" Anon.
61

955 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1992). The case description contained in the following two

paragraphs is taken from Northern Ins., 955 F.2d 1355-58.
62

In fact, one court and two scholars have equated the NorthernInsurance transaction with a

merger. See Texaco A/S, S.A. v. Commercial Ins. Co., No. 90 Civ. 2722, 1995 WL 628997 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 26, 1995); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE
DIsPUTES, § 19.02 (1994).
63

NorthernIns., 955 F.2d at 1356.
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In arriving at its decision, the Ninth Circuit first determined whether the

insurance policies had transferred to Brown-Forman by contract, finding that the
insurance policy was specifically excluded from the assets transferred to BrownForman in the asset purchase agreement.64 The court next considered whether the

right6 5to defense costs under the Allied Mutual polices transferred by operation of
law.

The district court had found that the right to indemnity under the Allied
Mutual policy transferred together with the liability imposed under the product-line
rule of successor liability. 6 The district court reasoned that because the liability
under the product-line rule transfers to the successor corporation irrespective of the
arrangements in the assets purchase agreement,67 then the right to indemnity under
the non-transferred insurance policies ought to transfer as well 8 However, on
appeal the issue in Northern Insurancewas Brown-Forman's right to defense costs,

Id. In the asset purchase agreement, the parties transferred all the assets of California Cooler,
except those assets specifically excluded in the section "Excluded Assets." Id. Among the excluded
assets were "any contracts that require consent to assign." Id.
64

65

Id.

66

Id. The Northern Insurance case was a diversity action and apparently California and

Washington were the two states whose law might apply. See generally id. Both California and
Washington observe the product-line exception, see supra note 25, so the choice of law question was
not an issue. It is interesting to note, however, the court stated that California and Washington apply
the product-line exception, "like many other jurisdictions." Id. On the contrary, only one other
jurisdiction applies the rule: New Jersey. See supra note 25.
67

California Cooler expressly retained all the liabilities after the transfer. Id. at 1355-56.

Additionally, California Cooler agreed to indemnify for all claims arising from the liabilities. Id.
68

Id. at 1357.
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not indemnity.69 Relying in part on an Eighth Circuit decision," the Northern
Insurance court concluded that Allied Mutual's exposure to risk was not
significantly inflated by requiring it to defend claims that arose from the pre-sale
conduct of California Cooler. 1 Thus, the court concluded "that the benefits of
Allied's policies, including the right to a defense, transferred by operation of law

69

See id. The Northern Insurance court noted that the right to indemnity under the Allied

policy was not precisely the issue. See id Because the Howards never obtained ajudgment, there was
no need for indemnity, per se. See id. What was at issue in Northern Insurance was the right to
defense costs. Id. However, the proposition that Northern Insuranceis usually cited for is the maxim
that the indemnity follows the liability rather than the policy holder. See, e.g., Total Waste
Management Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 140, 151 (D.N.H. 1994). The
Northern Insurance court seems to adopt this fairly controversial concept as if it is a given. See
generally Northern Ins., 955 F.2d at 1357. Essentially, the court asked, given that the successor is
entitled to the right to indemnity under the policy, should the successor also be entitled further to
defense costs? Id. Thus, the NorthernInsurance court ultimately focused on whether Brown-Forman
was entitled to defense costs, seemingly under the assumption that it was clearly entitled to the right
to indemnity under the policies. See generally id. at 1358.
70

Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. 100 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1939).

Ocean Accident dealt with the assignability of insurance policies when the policies contained nonassignment provisions. Id. at 443. The OceanAccident court reasoned that if the claim arose from presale activity, then the purpose for a non-assignable provision was meaningless. Id. at 445; Northern
Ins., 955 F.2d at 1358.
The idea behind ignoring non-assignable provisions in such cases is that the liability arises
before the sale of the assets; therefore the insurer's risk is not increased, because without the sale, it
would have had to cover the occurrence anyway. OceanAccident, 100 F.2d at 446; see also Northern
Ins., 955 F.2d at 1358. The assignment of the rights under the policy is in essence a "chose in action,"
similar to the right to a claim or debt. Ocean Accident, 100 F.2d at 446. The holder of the policy is
not transferring the entire policy, but the right to collect on a particular claim. A chose in action is
akin to assigning a debt to another party. The insured is entitled to payment under the policy because
an occurrence triggering the policy occurs prior to the transfer, and the insured simply assigns this right
to collect to another party. Id, By characterizing the claim as a "chose in action," the assignee is able
to collect under the claim despite any provisions in the policy restricting the transfer of the policy.
When the predecessor transfers its assets to the successor, the predecessor already is entitled to the
proceeds from its policies. As a result, the right to collect the proceeds transfers to the successor with
the rest of the assets rather than the policy itself.
71

NorthernhIs., 955 F.2d at 1358. Allied Mutual argued that its exposure to risk did increase

because the cost of defending a client was affected in part by the particular characteristics of the client.
Id. The court dismissed this argument, stating that the insurer would experience increased cost only
if there was a lack of cooperation on the part of the insured. Id. Because cooperation is a condition
precedent under the policy, if the insured refused to cooperate, it would not be entitled to indemnity
under the insurance policy. Id.
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to Brown-Forman when Brown-Forman purchased substantially all of California
Cooler's assets."'72
Northern Insurance has been cited by courts and litigants alike for the
proposition that when liabilities transfer by operation of law, insurance coverage
correspondingly transfers by operation of law.73 One view of Northern Insurance
is that the court created an equitable rule to correspond to the sometimes harsh
application of traditional contract principles. For example, some argue that because
Allied Mutual agreed to cover liabilities arising during a specific time period, the
fortuitous event of Brown-Forman purchasing California Cooler should not entitle
Allied to the windfall of not having to insure an occurrence that it received
premiums to cover.7 4 In addition, as a policy matter, assigning the insurance
coverage to the party who assumes product-line liability arguably facilitates the
injured plaintiff's ability to recover damages. Proponents of the Northern
Insurance decision would cite such arguments to support the court's holding.
However, there are alternative interpretations of the Northern Insurance
holding. First, the issue in Northern Insurancewas whether Brown-Forman was
entitled to defense costs in additionto indemnity.75 Essentially, the court's inquiry
was focused on whether the defense costs increased Allied Mutual's exposure to
risk, not whether the policies were transferred by operation of law.76 The Northern
Insurance court at no -time discussed the merits of a rule that insurance coverage
follows the liability by operation of law. Rather, the court simply accepts without

72

Id.

See, e.g., B.S.B. Diversified Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 947 F. Supp. 1476, 1481 (W-D.
Wash. 1996); cf General Refractories Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., Nos. CIV. A. 88-2167, CIV. A. 88250, available in 1995 WL 634451 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1995); Quemetco Inc. v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co.,
29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (criticizing Northern Insuranceto the extent that the
Ninth Circuit purported to be applying California law, and declining to extend the rule to claims arising
from environmental liability).
73

74

See GeneralRefractories, 1995 WL 634451, at *5 n.10 (addressing the windfall argument).

75

See NorthernIns., 955 F.2d at 1357.

See generally id. at 1358. Indeed, the court's entire discussion centers around Allied
Mutual's potentially increased exposure to risk. See id. After discussing the holding in Ocean
Accident, the court states, "The Ocean Accident court did not limit its holding to the right to indemnity.
It held that Southwestern Bell was entitled to all the rights under the policy, including the right to a
defense." Id. (citing Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Bell Tel. Co., 100 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir.
76

1939)).
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discussion the district court's determination that "this right to indemnity followed
the liability rather than the policy itself.""
Second, the Northern Insurance can be seen as a limited holding that
applies only to the factual situation presented in that case. In Northern Insurance,
Brown-Forman was entitled to indemnity under the asset purchase agreement. 8
Hence, the insurance benefits followed the party that was entitled to indemnity, in
that case Brown-Forman rather than California Cooler. In situations where the
successor does not have a right to indemnity, Northern Insurance may not apply.
Likewise, the case would not seem logically to apply to circumstances where a party

assumes liability in contract, rather than through an application of the product-line
exception.79 Thus,.a change in the facts of Northern Insurancecould potentially
change the result the court reached.8"
In addition to these varying interpretations of the Northern Insurance
holding, the precedential value of this case may also be in question. In the Ninth

Circuit, California appellate courts have refused to apply its principles to other
factual circumstances,"1 and have rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning outright.82
On the other hand, the decision has been embraced by a district court applying
Washington law.8

77

Id. at 1357.

Id. at 1355. An asset purchase agreement will typically contain cross-indemnification
provisions, where the seller will agree to indemnify the purchaser for all liabilities not transferred to
the purchaser, and the purchaser will indemnify the seller for all liabilities transferred to the purchaser.
In NorthernInsurance, California Cooler retained all the liabilities, and therefore the product liability
was not a contractually assumed liability. Id. Thus, Brown-Forman was entitled to indemnity from
California Cooler for any judgment arising from the non-assumed liability.
78

79

See Memorandum Opinion at 16, North River, No. 94-9706 (W.D. Pa. Mach 5, 1996).

See General Refractories Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., Nos. CIV. A. 88-2167, CIV. A. 88-250,
availablein 1995 WL 634451, at *6 n.14 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1995) (opining that in NorthernInsurance
"if the liability would not have transferred by operation of law, the Court believes, therefore, that the
rights to the insurance coverage would not have been transferred by operation of law").
80

81

See Quemetco Inc. v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 629-30 (Cal. Ct. App.

1994).
See General Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 64 Cal Rptr. 2d at 785
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
82

83

See B.S.B. Diversified Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 947 F. Supp. 1476, 1481 (W.D. Wash.

1996).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss3/7

22

Bates et al.: Asset Purchases, Successor Liability, and Insurance Coverage: Doe
1998]

ASSET PURCHASES,LEGAL LIABILITIES, AND INSURANCE

These concerns are especially important when the holding of Northern

Insurance is applied to factual situations different from the facts of that case. For
instance, in the North River case discussed earlier, the court found that when KII
assumed the liabilities pursuant to the asset purchase agreement, insurance coverage
did not correspondingly apply by operation of law!' Similarly, parties that rely on
the policy reasons behind Northern Insurance in an environmental liability setting

must thoroughly contemplate whether those principles apply. The following section
explores the applicability of the expansive successorship doctrines set forth in
Northern Insurance in the context of liability under CERCLA.
B.

Expansive Successorship Doctrines and Insurance Coverage Under
CERCLA

The leading case that applied the principles of Northern Insurance in an
environmental context is Total Waste Management Corporationv. Commercial
5 Total Waste Management arose when Kleen Laundry and Dry
Union Insurance."
84

Memorandum Opinion at 16, North River, No. 94-9706. The NorthernInsurance court also

did not consider the impact of transferring insurance coverage on the holder of the policy. This is
because in Northern Insurance the predecessor corporation, California Cooler, presumably was no
longer viable. One of the conditions of applying the product-line exception is that the predecessor
corporation must no longer be viable. See, e.g., Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 99-100
(3d Cir. 1994) ("[I]f the selling corporation remains a viable entity able to respond in damages to the
injured party, a successor acquiring a product line will not be liable for injuries caused by the
predecessor's product...") (citing Lapollo v. General Electric Co., 664 F. Supp. 178 (D.N.J. 1987)).
The destruction of the injured plaintiffs claim against the predecessor corporation is one of the basic
reasons for imposing successor liability in the first place. However, even though the predecessor
corporation may no longer be viable, another corporation may be the present holder of the policy and
may have an interest in the benefits of the policy.
For instance, in NorthernInsurance if California Cooler remained viable after the sale to
Brown-Forman, and another corporation - say, Corporation X - subsequently purchased the remainder
of California Cooler's assets, including the insurance policy with Allied Mutual, then Corporation X
would be the holder of the policy. If California Cooler subsequently went bankrupt, California Cooler
would no longer be viable, but Corporation X would have an interest in the policy, an interest that it
paid for in the asset purchase agreement. If the benefits under the policy were transferred to BrownForman, Corporation X would lose the benefits of the insurance policy through no fault of its own.
The question then becomes, between these two corporations, who is entitled to the insurance coverage,
provided that each has a legitimate right to its benefits? On the one hand, Brown-Forman may be
entitled to the benefits because it assumed liabilities contrary to the asset purchase agreement. On the
other hand, the insurance policy is an asset, see Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
v. City Saving F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 384 (3d Cir. 1994), and Brown-Forman would be acquiring by
judicial fiat - at the expense of Corporation X - what it could not obtain in contract negotiations.
Thus, when there is a viable corporation presently holding the insurance policy, the holding of
Northern Insurance is less instructive.
85

857 F. Supp. 140 (D.N.H. 1994).
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Cleaning Services sought contribution from Total Waste Management for costs it
incurred when responding to releases of hazardous substances.86 After the district
court determined that Total Waste Management potentially was a successor to the
liabilities of various parties that contributed to the release of hazardous
substances,87 Total Waste Management filed a declaratory action to determine
whether it was entitled to coverage for the clean-up costs under various insurance
policies."8
In the underlying action, Kleen Laundry & Dry CleaningServices, Inc. v.
Total Waste Management Corp.,"9 the plaintiff alleged that Total Waste
Management was a potentially responsible party under CERCLA as the successor
in interest to three other companies, including George West and Sons ("George
West"). Total Waste Management moved for summary judgment arguing, inter
alia, that as a matter of law it was not a successor to George West.
The court began its successor liability analysis in Kleen by noting that
under the "settled common-law rule," a successor does not assume liabilities of a
predecessor unless (1) the successor contractually assumes the liabilities, (2) the
transaction is a "de factor merger," (3) the successor may be considered a "mere
continuation" of the predecessor, or, (4) the transaction was fraudulent."0 The
plaintiff contended that Total Waste Management was the successor to George
West based on either the "de facto merger" or "mere continuation" exceptions to the
general rule of non-liability for successor corporations. After reviewing the
requirements of these exceptions, the court addressed the remedial policy
considerations behind CERCLA, and concluded, "[S]trict adherence to the
parochial requirements [of the de facto merger and mere continuation exceptions]
in CERCLA cases may in some instances conflict with the remedial policies
underlying [CERCLA]. Therefore, the court will adopt a 'common sense rather
than an overly restricted look at the corporate transfer.""'9 The court, therefore,

Id. at 142; see also Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Services, Inc. v. Total Waste
Management Corp., 817 F. Supp. 225 (D.N.H. 1993).
86

87

Kleen Laundry, 817 F. Supp. at 234.

88

Total Waste Management, 857 F. Supp. at 142.

817 F. Supp. 225 (D.N.H. 1993). Both Total Waste Management and Kleen Laundry were
decided by Judge DeClerico.
89

90

Id. at 229 (citations omitted).

Kleen Laundry,817 F. Supp. at 233 (citing United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637, 642
(W.D. Ky. 1990)).
91
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concluded that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether 'in substance, if not
in form,' [Total Waste Management] is liable as the successor corporation to
George West."'92
While Total Waste Management's summary judgment motion was pending
in Kleen, Total Waste Management filed a separate declaratory judgment action
claiming that if it succeeded to the liabilities of George West, 3 it should also
succeed to the rights of George West under insurance policies issued to George
West.94 To determine whether Total Waste Management was entitled to the
benefits of George West's policies, the court referred back to the district court's
earlier determination that Total Waste Management could be liable as a "successor
corporation."'95 In response to Total Waste Management's claim, George West's
insurance company, Maine Bonding, argued that the rule from Northern Insurance
should not be applied to its case for two reasons.96 First, Maine Bonding argued
that Total Waste Management was not a successor in liability and therefore was not
entitled to George West's insurance policies.9 7 The Total Waste Management court
rejected this argument, asserting that the Kleen Laundry court had already
determined that Total Waste Management could be liable under the defacto merger
doctrine.98 Second, Maine Bonding claimed that the principles underlying the

92

Kleen Laundry, 817 F. Supp. at 234 (citing Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 488

(8th Cir. 1992)).
The Kleen Laundry court found that Total Waste Management may be a successor in liability
to George West. Kleen Laundry, 817 F. Supp. at 234.
93

94

Total Waste Management Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 140, 150

(D.N.H. 1994).
95

Id. at 152 (citing Kleen Laundry, 817 F. Supp. at 234).

96

Id.

97

Id.

Id. In discussing Northern Insurance, the Total Waste Management court concluded, "a
material issue of fact exists as to whether TWM's [Total Waste Management's] purchase of certain
assets from George West [the predecessor] is really the purchase of George West's entire business and
as a result, TWM is a corporate successor to George West." Id. In Kleen Laundry, the court did not
actually find that Total Waste Management was a successor to George West, only that a genuine issue
of material fact existed whether the transaction was actually a defacto merger. See Kleen Laundry,
817 F. Supp. at 232-33. Total Waste Management argued that there could not be a defacto merger
because George West continued as a separate corporate entity after the transaction, retaining some of
its assets and all of its liabilities. Id. One can only speculate what the transaction between Total Waste
Management and George West looked like, but it is likely that Total Waste Management took all of
98
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decision were exclusive to product liability claims, and therefore should not be

applied in the environmental context. 9 The Total Waste Management court spent
little time making the leap and applied Northern Insurance to environmental

cases.' 00 The court stated, "the court finds the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is
persuasive authority in deciding whether a potential corporate successor is entitled
to coverage under its predecessor's insurance policy for a risk occurring before the
transfer of assets."' 0'1
The Western District of Washington also applied the Northern Insurance

rule in an environmental context in B.S.B. Diversified Co., Inc. v. American
MotoristsInsurance Co.' 2 In this case, B.S.B Diversified ("BSB") purchased the
assets of Criton Technologies ("Criton"). °3 In the asset purchase agreement, BSB
agreed to assume all of Criton's liabilities." 4 After the purchase, property formerly
held by Criton became the source of environmental liability.'0 5 BSB tried then to
access the insurance policies issued to Criton that potentially responded to the
environmental liabilities. 6 The insurance companies argued that BSB had no

the valuable assets, and left the liabilities and the least valuable assets with George West. By taking
all the valuable portions of the business and leaving all the liabilities and valueless assets with George
West, the court could have determined that a de facto merger took place, despite George West's
continued corporate existence.
99

Total Waste Management, 857 F. Supp. at 152.

1oo

Ial

Id.; accordTexaco v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, No. 90 CIV. 2722 (JFK), available
in 1995 WL 628997, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In Texaco, the court applied the rule from Northern
Insurance to a merger situation rather than a product-line situation. Id. The court actually
characterized Northern Insuranceas holding "that the surviving corporation of a corporatemerger is
entitled to insurance coverage under policies issued to the merger corporation for claims arising out
of the pre-acquisition activities of the merged corporation." Id. (emphasis added). The Texaco court
focused on whether the insurer's risk is increased by allowing the merged corporation to access a
policy. Id. The court used the discussion in NorthernInsurance to justify the transfer of a policy to
the merged corporation despite an anti-assignment clause in the policy. Id.
101

102

947 F. Supp. 1476 (W.D. Wash. 1996).

103

Id. at 1478.

"04

Id.

105

Id.

Actually, the policies were issued to Criton's predecessor. Id. at 1479. However, the
insurers conceded that the policies transferred from Criton's predecessor to Criton. Id.
106
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insurable interest in the policies: BSB neither acquired an interest in the policies as
a matter of contract nor by operation of law.'0 7 The court rejected the insurance
companies' first contention, finding that the policies were assigned to BSB as a
matter of contract in the asset purchase agreement.' However, instead of deciding
the case on that issue alone, the court stated that in the alternative, the policies also
transferred by operation of law."0 9 The court stated, "this Court would extend the
holding in NorthernInsuranceto a successor responsible for environmental cleanup
' 0
where the events creating liability occurred prior to the transfer of liability.""
While both B.S.B. Diversified and Total Waste Management purport to
apply the rule from Northern Insurance,both cases represent an expansion of the
Northern Insurance holding. Total Waste Management expands Northern
Insurance from the product liability area to environmental liabilities."' By
applying Northern Insuranceto a completely different set of facts and a different
statutory scheme, Total Waste Management arguably expands the Northern
Insurance holding. Most notably, in Total Waste Managementthere was not a third
party tort victim, yet the court still analogized CERCLA liability to product liability
and applied the rule from Northern Insurance.
Arguably, there are similar policy concerns in both NorthernInsurance and
Total Waste Management - both cases transferred insurance when the successor
corporation was assigned liability contrary to the provisions of the asset purchase
agreement."' However, the B.S.B. Diversified court arguably expanded the
Northern Insurance holding much further. In B.S.B. Diversified,the successor
Thus, the
corporation contractually assumed the underlying liability."'
environmental liability at issue was not judicially imposed on BSB as it was on

107

Id.

1o8

Id. at 1480.

109

Id. at 1481.

110

Id.

III

Total Waste Management Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 140, 152

(D.N.H. 1994).
112

Compare Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1355-56

(9th Cir. 1992) and Total Waste Management, 857 F. Supp. at 142-43.
113

B.S.B. Diversified,947 F. Supp. at 1478.
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The liability transferred as the parties had
Total Waste Management."'
contractually agreed in B.S.B. Diversified."5 The suggestion in B.S.B. Diversified
that the insurance policies would be transferred as a matter of law when the liability
is imposed certainly would be an extension of the Northern Insuranceholding." 6
Furthermore, BSB was in a position to protect itself from the liability
during the asset purchase transaction." 7 When the court indicated that it would
unravel this agreement, it seemingly ignored the fact that the parties should have
negotiated the issue ex ante in the asset purchase agreement. Thus, when the court

indicated that the insurance policies could transfer by operation of law, it was
disregarding the negotiation of two sophisticated parties, bargaining at arms length.
In North River, the district court reached a result opposite to B.S.B.
Diversified."' Instead, in recognition of freedom of contract, the court held the
parties to the contractual arrangement they had agreed upon pursuant to the asset
purchase agreement."' KII had agreed to assume the liability but did not bargain

for the insurance policies to cover the potential liability. 2

The court did not

choose to take proceeds from insurance policies from their holder and transfer them
121
to KII.
North River and B.S.B. Diversified represent two completely different
approaches to the issue of insurance coverage and successor liability." The extent

Compare B.S.B. Diversified,947 F. Supp. at 1478 and Total Waste Management, 857 F.
Supp. at 152.
114

"5

See generally B.S.B. Diversified,947 F. Supp. at 1478-79.

116

See generally id at 1478. To be accurate, the court also found that the policies transferred

by contract. Id. at 1480. However, the court found in the alternative that the policies transferred by
operation of law. For the court to find that the policies transferred by operation of law, it had to
assume, for the sake of argument, that the policies did not transfer contractually. Thus, the discrete
issue whether the policies transfer by operation of law necessarily assumes that the parties did not
transfer the policies via the asset purchase agreement.
117

See generally id.

118

Compare Memorandum Opinion at 17, North River, No. 94-1706 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1996)

and B.S.B. Diversified,947 F. Supp. at 1481.
119

Memorandum Opinion at 17, North River, No. 94-1706.

120

Id. at 8.

121

Id. at 16.

122

Compare id. at 16 and B.S.B. Diversified, 947 F. Supp. at 1481.
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to which the involvement and viability of the predecessor was an unspoken factor
to the courts is unknown. In North River, the court considered the interest of KCI,
the holder of the policy."2 In B.S.B. Diversified,the court never considered the
impact of transferring an insurance policy from a party that valued the policy as an
asset. 24 Indeed, Criton was not even a party to the action.' 25 But in North River,
KCI, which had an interest in the insurance policy, intervened as an interested
party. 126 Thus, from a practical standpoint, if a corporation holding the insurance
policy remains viable, the dynamics of transferring the policy may change. If the
policy holder is no longer engaged in a business or managing historical liabilities
that may be insured under the policy, courts may equitably, but perhaps illogically,
be more willing to transfer the policy. However, if a viable corporation is holding
the insurance policy, then a court may be less likely to undo the arrangement
between the parties and allow the successor an unbargained-for benefit of access to
the predecessor's insurance policies.
Aside from considering the interests of a viable corporation that presently
holds the insurance policies, courts may decline to apply the Northern Insurance
rationale altogether. 127 For instance, in Quemetco Inc. v. Pacific Automobile
Insurance Co."'28 the California Court of Appeals declined to apply Northern
Insurance to environmental liability.'29 Quemetco arose when Quemetco Inc.
("Quemetco") sought indemnity from several insurers that had issued insurance
policies to Western Lead Products Company ("Western Lead"). 3 ' Western Lead

123

See generally Memorandum Opinion at 16-17, North River, No. 94-1706.

124

See B.S.B. Diversified, 947 F. Supp. at 1481.

125

See generally id. at 1477.

126

See generally Memorandum Opinion at 4, North River, No. 94-1706. If KII was able to

access KCI's insurance policies, the amount of coverage available to respond to KCI's claims would
be reduced. See General Refractories Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., Nos. CIV. A. 88-2167, CIV. A. 88250, availablein 1995 WL 634451, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1995) ("Since Great Lakes continued it[s]
operations after the sale of the GLCC entities, any transfer of insurance rights would have effectively
reduced, at Great Lakes' expense, the coverage available for the continued operations.").
127

See, e.g., General Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 64 Cal Rptr. 2d

781, 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
128

29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).

129

Id. at 632.

130

Id. at 628. Quemetco purchased a portion of Western Lead's assets. Id. at 627.
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had shipped hazardous wastes to the Stringfellow Acid Pits in Glen Avon,

California.' 3' Quemetco, among others, was sued under
CERCLA and various state
32
laws for the contamination of the Stringfellow Pits.

The Quemetco court criticized the Ninth Circuit's characterization of
California law in Northern Insurance. 3 However, rather than rejecting Northern
Insuranceoutright, the majority in Quemetco chose instead to distinguish Northern

Insurance.'

The court noted that the product liability in Northern Insurance

transferred by operation of law to the successor corporation Brown-Forman

35

The

court then distinguished Quemetco by stating that because CERCLA had not been
passed when Quemetco purchased the assets of Western Lead, the CERCLA
liability could not have "passed as a matter of law.., as no such liability existed
at that time."' 36 The court then held that "the product-line successor liability rule
should not be applied to transfer the insurance policy from [Western Lead] to
[Quemetco] as a matter of law.""'
The Quemetco court seized on the portion of Northern Insurance that

discussed the transfer of insurance policies notwithstanding anti-assignment
provisions.'3 8 The Quemetco court reasoned that because CERCLA had not been

11

Id. at 628.

132

Id.

Id. at 629-30. The court claimed that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider two relevant cases,
which should have provided guidance to the court in NorthernInsurance. Id.
133

134

See generally id.at 631.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

See generally id. The Northern Insurance court relied on an Eighth Circuit decision that

held insurance coverage transferred despite an anti-assignment provision in the policy. See Northern
Ins. Co. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1357-1358 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Ocean Accident
& Guar. Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 100 F.2d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 1939). The Eighth Circuit
reasoned that the liability arose prior to the transfer, and therefore the predecessor had a right to the
insurance benefits before the transfer. See Ocean Accident, 100 F.2d at 446. Consequently, the
benefits under the policies transferred as a "chose in action" rather than the policy itself transferring
to the successor corporation. Ocean Accident, 100 F.2d at 446. See also supra note 70.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss3/7

30

Bates et al.: Asset Purchases, Successor Liability, and Insurance Coverage: Doe
1998]

ASSET PURCHASES, LEGAL LIABILITIES, AND INSURANCE

passed into law, the "chose in action"'3 9 did not transfer at the time of the asset
sale.14 Thus, the Quemetco court held that the rule from Northern Insurance
should not be expanded from product liability cases to apply to claims that arise

under CERCLA."4 '
The majority decision received sharp criticism from the dissent in
Quemetco.'42 The dissent rejected the majority's reason for distinguishing
Quemetco from NorthernInsurance: "What is relevant is whether the predecessor's
acts occurred before the sale, not whether they matured into cognizable causes of

139

Ocean Accident, 100 F.2d at 446. See supra note 70 for further discussion of a "chose in

action."
140

Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631. The court did not discuss whether the insurer's risk

would increase if the policies were transferred by operation of law. The only attention the court paid
to the insurer's increased risk was in the context of the rationale behind consent to assign provisions.
See id. at 632; but see Delmar R. Ehrich & Michael A. Ponto, Insurance Coveragefor Corporate
Successors Under CERCLA, 7 ENVTL. CLAIMSJ. 125, 130-32 (1994) (claiming that the Quemetco court
rested part of its holding on the fact that the insurer would be faced with increased risk).
Northern Insurance was primarily based on the idea that the insurer's risk is not enlarged
by making it cover liabilities that it already contracted to cover. See generallyNorthern Ins., 955 F.2d
at 1358. Courts have already decided that general comprehensive liability policies cover CERCLA
liability. See, e.g., B.S.B. Diversified,947 F. Supp. at 1479 (citing Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990)). Consequently, one can argue that the insurance company's risk
is not increased by transferring the benefits under the policies when successor liability is applied under
CERCLA - at least no more than it would be in the product liability area. The Quemetco court did not
respond to this argument nor explain whether applying the rule from Northern Insurance in the
environmental context would increase the insurer's risk more than it would in the product liability area.
141

Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631. Quemetco interjects a temporal aspect into the inquiry

whether insurance coverage transfers when successor liability is imposed under CERCLA. The court
held that because CERCLA was not law at the time of the transfer, no liability could have passed to
Quemetco. Id. The decision leaves the door open for future situations where the asset purchase
occurred after the passage of CERCLA.
The dissent from Quemetco characterized the majority decision as an outright rejection of
Northern Insurance. See id. at 632. However, the majority opinion seems careful to avoid directly
criticizing the Ninth Circuit. See generally id. at 629-3 1. The consequence of this cordial approach
is that the decision is open to an interpretation that insurance coverage may be transferred if successor
liability is imposed under CERCLA and the asset purchase occurred after CERCLA was signed into
law. See generally id. at 631; but see General Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Alameda County,
64 Cal Rptr. 2d 781, 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting Northern Insurancebecause "[t]he law can
impose tort liability on a successor corporate entity; it cannot impose a contractual insurance
relationship between an insurer and a stranger to the insurance contract"). The GeneralAccident case
is a recent California Court of Appeals decision and may more accurately reflect California law on the
subject; although, GeneralAccident was decided by a different appellate district than was Quemetco.
142

See Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632.
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action before that time."'43 Like the court in Northern Insurance,the dissent in
Quemetco focused on whether the insurer's risk is increased by transferring the

coverage to the successor corporation.'

At the end of its discussion, the dissent

concluded that NorthernInsurance was rightly decided and that the principle that
"insurance benefits follow liability in 'successor liability' situations by operation
of law [and] ...this principle applies to all 'successor liability' situations[,] not just
'product liability cases' ....
"145
Total Waste Management, B.S.B. Diversified, and Quemetco all represent
varying approaches to the issue of transferring insurance coverage by operation of
law when product liability successorship doctrines are applied to CERCLA

liabilities.4 6 B.S.B. Diversified is the most liberal application of the Northern
Insurance rule, tTansferring the insurance coverage to the successor corporation
despite the fact that the successor corporation contractually assumed the

143

Id. at 635.

See generally id. at 633-35. The dissent reconciled the two cases that the majority claimed
Northern Insurancefailed to consider. Id. at 632-33. One of the opinions cited by the majority was
authored by the dissenting judge. Id. at 632. The first case, Oliver Machinery Co. v. United States
Fidelity& Guar.Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 691 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), the dissent argued, was not on-point
because it discussed the construction of the term "additional insured" in an insurance policy and did
not decide whether insurance coverage transfers by operation of law. Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
633. The second case, PenasquitosInc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154 (Cal. 1991), held that a
plaintiff may maintain a cause of action against a dissolved corporation, and further that the dissolved
corporation's insurance company may be required to defend the claim. Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 633. The dissent argued that the Penasquitosdecision could actually be construed to support the
plaintiff's position in Quemetco. Id. The dissent claimed that "there is no inequity in requiring the
predecessor corporation's insurer to cover the successor corporation for harm the predecessor caused
while in control of the operation." Id. at 633. Thus, the dissent claimed that neither of the two cases
cited by the majority undermihed the Northern Insuranceholding. Id.
144

145

Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.

146

Compare B.S.B. Diversified Co., Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 947 F. Supp. 1476, 1481

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that insurance benefits follow liability rather than the holder of the policy
despite the contractual assumption of liability by the successor corporation); Total Waste Management
Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 140, 151 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that when liability
is judicially imposed on a successor corporation contrary to the asset purchase agreement, the successor
corporation is entitled to the benefits of the predecessor corporation's insurance policies) and
Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631 (declining to transfei the benefits of an insurance policy to the
successor corporation when the asset purchase agreement does not transfer the policies to the successor
corporation). See also EM Indus. Inc. v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 529 N.Y.S.2d
121, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (finding that the successor corporation was entitled to insurance
benefits when it bought the "business and properties" from the predecessor corporation).
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liabilities." 7 Total Waste Management is closer, in a factual context, to the decision
in Northern Insurance: in both cases the liability was imposed on the successor
corporation contrary to the express provisions of the asset purchase agreement."'
Finally, in Quemetco, the court seemingly rejects the premise that insurance
when the policy
coverage follows the liability rather than the holder of the policy
49
is not expressly transferred in the asset purchase agreement.
The cases discussed above do not focus on any of the distinctions between
CERCLA claims and product liability claims, seeming to suggest that the analysis
from Northern Insurance either (1) may be applied equally in an environmental
case 150 or (2) may be rejected based on its fundamental principle that the policy
follows the liability, with very little attention paid to the underlying policy
differences between CERCLA and product liability claims.' 5 ' Courts have yet to
identify the differing policy considerations behind product liability and CERCLA
claims in supporting or rejecting the transfer of insurance coverage to corporations
found to be successors to liability under product liability successorship doctrines.
Some argue that the policy considerations behind the two types of claims suggests
that the issue should be considered similarly, while others claim that the policy
considerations underlying the two types of claims are very different. In many
respects, the similarity or difference is dependent upon the facts of the case and
one's point of view. Should fundamental contract principles be eroded to find a
"deep pocket" to make whole a personally injured plaintiff? Should corporate
restructuring be permitted to leave an injured party without any recourse? Should
courts be in the business of rewriting contracts to protect parties that failed to
receive those protections as part of the negotiating process? Do the astronomical
amounts at stake in environmental insurance coverage cases alter the equitable

147

See generally B.S.B. Diversified,947 F. Supp. at 1481.

148

CompareNorthern Ins. Co. v. Allied Mut Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir. 1992) and

Total Waste Management, 857 F. Supp. at 152.
149

See Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631; see also General Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court

of Alameda County, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
150

See Total Waste Management, 857 F. Supp. at 151.

1st

Admittedly, the Quemetco court claimed that the Northern Insurance decision did not apply
to CERCLA claims. Quemetco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631. However, as suggested. by the dissent in
Quemetco, it seems that the majority's decision was based on a fundamental disagreement with the
conclusion reached in Northern Insurance,not on any obvious distinction between CERCLA and
product liability claims with respect to the transfer of insurance coverage. See generally id. at 631.
Moreover, the only difference the majority noted was that CERCLA was not enacted at the time of the

asset transfer. Id.
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considerations? Should successorship issues be handled differently depending upon
the type of plaintiff and the involvement of the plaintiff in the business relationship
giving rise to the successorship claim? Will the business climate be adversely
affected if uncertainty creeps into the validity of the allocation of liabilities and
assets among the buyer and seller to an asset purchase agreements? Logic may
yield one answer to these and similar questions, while public policy, practicality,
and the facts and equities of a particular case may yield another.
V. UNRESOLVED ISSUES

This Part discusses some of the issues which remain unresolved as courts
continue to struggle with these complex and novel questions. Specifically, this Part
discusses the following: (1) the structuring of asset purchase agreements, (2)
"equitable arguments" that may be presented in litigation regarding these issues, and
(3) insurance issues.
A.

StructuringAsset PurchaseAgreements

In light of the cases discussed above wherein courts have arguably "rewritten" asset purchase agreements and allowed a successor corporation to access
the predecessor's insurance policies, parties to asset purchase agreements may not
enjoy the security that liabilities and the insurance benefits will remain with the
parties as agreed to in the asset purchase agreement.'52 Outlined below are some
ways in which purchasers and sellers involved in asset purchase agreements may
react to this increasing uncertainty.
Purchasers may demand access to any insurance policies that correspond
to the liabilities that the purchaser is contractually assuming. Conversely, if
purchasers are not able to obtain the predecessor corporation's insurance policies
in the asset purchase, purchasers may attempt independently to acquire insurance
coverage for CERCLA liabilities arising from historical operations of predecessor
corporations.'53 In other words, as purchasers become cognizant of the results of

152

See, e.g., Northern Ins., 955 F.2d at 1358; B.S.B. Diversified,947 F. Supp. at 1481.

153

One commentator claims that such insurance coverage is impossible to attain: "An attorney

in the Underwriting Department of one of the leading firms selling these policies had never heard of
the concept of environmental insurance coverage specifically for a predecessor's operations." Green,
supranote 22, at 928-29 n.158 (citing Telephone Interview with James Goodman, Division Attorney,
Pollution Department, Commerce and Industry Insurance Company (Sept. 1, 1992)). Today, however,
in the era of Brownfields Redevelopment Programs, environmental insurance for historical operations
is available in the marketplace. In fact, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("USEPA") has recently issued the results of a survey of eight major insurance companies that offer
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cases such as Northern Insuranceand realize that asset purchase agreements may
not necessarily fully define the scope of their successor liability, they may

increasingly look to the insurance industry for protection from financial uncertainty.
If expansive concepts of successor liability are imposed under CERCLA,
sellers may become acutely concerned that their insurance policies will be depleted
by the successor corporation. Indeed, sellers can be stung by the transfer of
insurance polices under NorthernInsurance.1" Usually, the seller potentially faces
one of two situations. In the first, the asset purchase agreement transfers the
liabilities to the purchasing corporation, but does not correspondingly transfer the
insurance policies. In these situations, unless the transaction is carefully structured,
some courts may transfer the policies to the successor corporation contrary to the
agreement.'5s An alternative approach for sellers in this situation is to work with
the insurance carriers to add the successor as an additional named insured to their
policies for adequate consideration, rather than facing the possibility that a court
may transfer the benefits of the policies with no consideration at all to the
predecessor.' In the second situation, the liabilities are retained by the seller, but

a court nonetheless judicially imposes successor liability on the purchasing

environmental plans. The results generally indicate that insurance is available and is being purchased,
typically on a site by site basis, often as part of a Brownfields Redevelopment Strategy. See USEPA,
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Potential Insurance Productsfor Brownflelds

Cleanup and Redevelopment, EPA Publication 500-F-97-106 (April 1997) (available at
<http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-doc/insurance.htm> (visited April 10, 1998)).
154
"[A]ny transfer of insurance rights would have effectively reduced, at [the seller's] expense,
the coverage available for the continued operations." General Refractories Co. Inc. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., Nos. CIV. A. 88-2167, CIV. A. 88-250, availablein 1995 WL 634451, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27,
1995).
155
See, e.g., B.S.B. Diversified,947 F. Supp. at 1481; contra Memorandum Opinion at 17,

North River, No. 94-1706 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1996); GeneralRefractories,1995 WL 634451, at *5.

The holding from B.S.B. Diversifiedmay place the seller corporation in a precarious position
with respect to transferring insurance policies when the parties are negotiating the asset purchase
agreement. See generallyB.S.B. Diversified, 947 F. Supp. at 1481 (transferring insurance policies to
a successor corporation contrary to the asset purchase agreement). If the purchaser knows that a court
is going to ignore the asset purchase agreement and transfer insurance policies whenever successor
liability is imposed - contractually or otherwise - why would the purchaser agree to exchange any
consideration for the policy? Thus, the seller is not in an equal bargaining position if the holding from
B.S.B. Diversified is the settled law of the jurisdiction. However, the holdings of B.S.B. Diversified
and other like cases are not at all settled law. Furthermore, because contracts are designed to avoid
future litigation, purchasers may not be willing to leave the status of the insurance policies to the
outcome of future litigation. Finally, purchasers that count on insurance policies to be judicially
transferred without adequate consideration will also have to subtract the cost of litigating the claim
against both the predecessor corporation and the insurance company.
156
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corporation.' 57 When a court judicially imposes successor liability under CERCLA,
some courts may correspondingly transfer the insurance benefits to the successor
corporation.'58 However, in the reported decisions to date, courts have only
imposed successor liability when the predecessor corporation is no longer viable.'59
From the perspective of the parties negotiating the asset purchase
agreement, the threat of expansive successor liability under CERCLA and the
uncertain status of corresponding insurance policies makes an asset acquisition less
final than the parties desire.' 61 Insurance products may be available to alleviate
these concerns, but purchase of those products increases the costs of the transaction.
Consequently, the considerations discussed above will often factor into the
negotiation, drafting, and due diligence of an asset acquisition on the part of both
sellers and purchasers.
B.

LitigationIssues: EquitableArguments

Based on the divergent holdings of the few courts that have thus far
addressed the issue, there is a split of authority as to whether, and when, a successor
may access a predecessor's insurance coverage. For example, some courts may use
liability as a benchmark: the party who assumes the liability also is entitled to the
benefits of the general comprehensive liability policy.' 6 ' Other courts may rely
primarily on the contractual stipulations between
the parties contained within the
62
agreement.'
purchase
asset
the
of
four corners

157

See, e.g., Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Serv., Inc. v. Total Waste Management Corp., 817

F. Supp. 225, 234 (D.N.H. 1993).
158

See Total Waste Management Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 140, 152

(D.N.H. 1994).
159

See Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1994).

160

Compare Total Waste Management, 857 F. Supp at 152 (transferring the benefits of

insurance policies after successor liability had been imposed under CERCLA) with Quemetco Inc. v.
Pacific Automobile Ins. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (declining to transfer
insurance policies once successor liability had been imposed under CERCLA).
161

See, e.g., Northern Ins. Co. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1992)

("This right to indemnity followed the liability rather than the policy itself.").
See, e.g., General Refractories Co. Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., Nos. CIV. A. 88-2167, CIV.
A. 88-250, availablein 1995 WL 634451, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1995) ("If... a purchase and sale
agreement is used, the contractual terms negotiated by the parties will typically govem .... ).
162
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Ultimately, however, when the reasoning behind these cases is analyzed,
courts appear to be taking an equitable approach to resolving these issues. For
example, courts have considered some of the following factors, among others: (1)
whether the liability is judicially imposed or contractually assumed; 63 (2) whether
the parties had the opportunity to protect themselves contractually;" (3) whether
a viable corporation has a present interest in the policies;' 65 and (4) whether
transferring the insurance policy makes recovery easier for an innocent injured
party." If this "equitable analysis" is actually occurring, courts may, in the longrun, be better served by expressly stating that there is no "bright-line" test for the
transferring of insurance. In the meantime, while logic may yield one result, the
facts and equities of a particular case may yield another, and clear rules of law in
this area will be illusory.
One interpretation of Northern Insurance is that the transfer of insurance
coverage by "operation of law" in that case was really an equitable solution to
soften the harsh application of product-line successor liability. Consequently, if a
court judicially imposes CERCLA liability on its successor corporation, the
successor may argue that in fairness it also ought to be entitled to the predecessor's
insurance coverage. This argument holds its greatest force when the holder of the
policy (the predecessor) is no longer a viable corporation: 67 the fact that no one else
can access the benefits of the insurance policy, coupled with the fact that the
purchaser has incurred, arguably unfairly, CERCLA liability contrary to the asset
purchase agreement, presents a situation where courts may find that the purchaser
is entitled to equitable relief. Furthermore, the successor may argue that (1) the
insurer's risk is not increased by transferring the policy because the insurer is only

163

See Memorandum Opinion at 16, North River, No. 94-1706 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1996); Total

Waste Management, 857 F. Supp. at 151.
164

Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 1996).

165

See supranote 84.

166

As a practical matter, if a court knows that a successor corporation cannot afford the cost of

environmental clean-up under CERCLA, it may be more likely to transfer the insurance policies to
fund the clean-up. Especially if the court sits in the jurisdiction where the environmental
contamination occurred, a court may choose to consider the economic realities of getting the site clean
over the analytical consistency of transferring insurance coverage to parties that are not entitled to the
coverage.
167

See generallyNorthern Ins. Co. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1355-56 (9th Cir

1992); see also supra note 84.
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required to cover one occurrence, 6 ' and (2) the insurance company will gain a
windfall if the policies do not transfer because it is relieved of its obligation to
cover an occurrence that it received premiums to cover. 69
The successor's "equitable" argument, however, has far less force when the
When the predecessor is a viable
predecessor corporation remains viable.'
corporation whose insurance coverage would be depleted, the successor must
convince the court that its interest in the policy outweighs the interest of the holder
of the policy. No reported decision to date has specifically transferred insurance
policies to a successor corporation at the expense of a viable predecessor

corporation. 171
The predecessor may also make equitable arguments in attempting to
prevent the transfer of insurance policies to the purchaser.'7 2 For example,
predecessor corporations may argue that the insurance policy is an asset with
financial worth to the seller.'73 The predecessor may further argue that to transfer
the policy to the purchaser would be to give the purchaser assets that it did not pay
for, and give the purchaser a benefit of a bargain that it did not achieve through the
contract negotiations for the purchase of the assets. 74

See Total Waste Management, 857 F. Supp. at 153 (stating that the policy at issue should
transfer to the successor corporation because the insurer's "risk is therefore no greater than when the
policy 'covers only the risk it evaluated when it wrote the policy.") (quoting Northern Ins., 955 F.2d
at 1358).
168

But see General Refractories Co. Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., Nos. CIV. A. 88-2167, CIV. A.
88-250, availablein 1995 WL 634451, at *5 n.10 (rejecting a windfall argument made by a purchaser
who contractually assumed the liabilities).
169

See Memorandum Opinion at 17, North River, No. 94-1706 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1996);
General Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Alamena County, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 788 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997).
170

171

See Memorandum Opinion at 17, North River, No. 94-1706; GeneralRefractories,1995 WL

634451 at *5.
Typically, predecessors in asset purchase agreements will initially argue freedom of contract
principles in attempting to block the potential transfer of insurance policies contrary to the terms of
172

an asset purchase agreement. See GeneralRefractories, 1995 WL 634451, at *7 ("If... a purchase

and sale agreement is used, the contractual terms negotiated by the parties will typically govern the
transfer of specific rights and liabilities. This is particularly true where.., the transferor remains in
existence after the sale.").
173

See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Savings, F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 384 (3d Cir. 1994).

174

See GeneralRefractories, 1995 WL 634451, at *5.
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Insurance Issues

Insurance companies hold a unique position when defending claims brought
by successor corporations trying to access insurance policies issued to the
predecessor corporation after liability has been imposed under CERCLA. Logic
would dictate that one of the relevant considerations, but by no means the only
consideration, should be whether the predecessor corporation remains viable.
Insurance companies faced with a declaratory judgment action by a
successor corporation trying to access the policies of the non-viable predecessor
corporation may argue that their risk is increased by requiring them to cover
liabilities of a myriad of successor corporations. 7 s After all, in many of the megamergers of the 1980s, individual business units of the predecessor were often
divested to individual purchasers, some of whom have spun those units off again,
yielding scores of potential "successors." Insurers may also argue that Northern
Insurance is not sound public policy - particularly when the underlying business
transaction is more complex than that presented in California Coolers" 6 - because
to transfer the policies to a successor would give the benefits of a policy to an entity
that did not pay for it.' For example, in North River, North River was able to
argue that an insurance policy may be viewed as an asset, and if the asset is taken
from the predecessor, the successor would enjoy benefits it could not achieve in
contract to the financial detriment of the predecessor."' To be sure, considering the
equitable factors, a court may lean more heavily in the insurer's favor when the
insurance company is asserting the interests of the holder of the policy in addition
to its own interests.
When there is no viable corporation presently holding the insurance policy,
insurance companies may be susceptible to a windfall argument, i.e., the insurance

See Northern Ins. Co. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F. 2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir. 1992); B.S.B.
Diversified Co., Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 947 F. Supp. 1476, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Total Waste
Management Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 140, 151 (D.N.H. 1994) (all rejecting
this argument).
175

See General Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781,
788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ("[A] transfer by operation of law is a violation of the basic principles of
contract and is also bad public policy .... Under the [NorthernInsurance rule], an insurer which was
never a party to an insurance contract can be held liable to an 'insured' that has never paid a premium
or.been subjected to an underwriting analysis.").
176

177

See id. ("[The law] cannot impose a contractual insurance relationship between an insurer

and a stranger to the insurance contract.").
178

See generally Memorandum Opinion at 16, North River, No. 94-1706 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5,

1996).
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company is essentially receiving a windfall by not having to cover an occurrence
that it has contracted to cover.'79 Some courts have rejected the windfall argument
and held that an insurance policy should not be transferred by operation of law even
when this might apply;8 0 however, the insurance company must overcome the fact
that a defunct predecessor holds the benefits from a policy that is fully paid for, but
due to corporate restructuring, no one can ever access the policies. The situation
obviously becomes more complex where there are scores of potential successors.
Nevertheless, while the insurer may have persuasive legal arguments based in
contract,' 81 it may not enjoy the equitable advantage that in the end could be the
deciding factor in some courts.'82
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts have taken two distinct approaches in deciding whether insurance
policies may be judicially transferred from a predecessor to a successor corporation
once successor liability has been imposed under CERCLA. In one camp, courts
uphold the sanctity of the contract negotiated by the parties to the business
transaction.' In the other camp, courts have transferred insurance coverage as an
equitable solution to the judicial imposition of successor liability as a matter of
public policy and contrary to the terms of the asset purchase agreement.'84 In the
end, the results of the few courts deciding these issues to date may well have
depended upon the facts and equities of the particular case, and the judicial
demeanor of the court: is the court likely to take an Adam Smith, Posner-type
"freedom of contract" approach or is the court likely to formulate an equitable
solution based on various policy considerations? 8 5 When advising clients with
179

See General Refractories, 1995 WL 634451, at *5 n.10.

180

See generally GeneralAccident,64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.

181

See GeneralAccident,64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785 ("An insured-insurer relationship is a matter

of contract.").
182

See generally United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., No. I :CV-93-1482, 1996 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 1365, at *44 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1996).
183

See General Refractories, 1995 WL 634451, at *5.

184

See Total Waste Management Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 140, 151

(D.N.H. 1994).
185

Compare, e.g., Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir.

1996) and Keystone Sanitation, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13561, at *33.
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respect to these issues, be mindful that while logic may yield one result, the facts
and equities of a particular case may well yield another.
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